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Introductory
An extraordinary change in the substance and tone of discourse on Japan took place 
both inside and outside the country in the 1990s. Its emblem was the take-off of the 
term “lost decades.” The first published use in English appears to have been a News-
week story in 1998. The first use in Japanese was probably the very same day in a 
Nikkei newspaper column attributing the expression to foreign investors. 1 It hardly 
matters which came first. The idea that Japan was declining or lost was a co-produc-
tion of global and local voices.
　　As the problems associated with the condition of loss persisted, the singular “de-
cade” gave way to the plural “decades,” but the discourse of loss has consistently fo-
cused on two topics: first and foremost, on economic stagnation. But second, and also 
importantly, it has focused on a host of social problems seen as both cause and effect 
of an ailing economy, even though all of these predated the bursting of Japan’s bubble 
economy: an aging society and falling birthrate; rising inequality of income, assets, and 
education; limited change in women’s roles; a perceived decline in energy or ambition 
among youth. Put simply, the consciousness of Japan as “lost” resulted from the punc-
turing not only of an economic bubble, but also of a social myth: that Japan had be-
come and could remain a mass middle class society. The years from the 1990s onward 
have eroded faith in the possibility of the great majority of people to achieve member-
ship in the middle-class, whose hero was the “salaryman” and whose heroine was the 
“professional housewife.” ２
　　The onset of the “lost decades” bisects my own 45 years of connection to Japan, 
and the notion that something profound had changed at the midpoint drew my atten-
1 　Bill Powell, “The Lost Decade,” Newsweek （July ２7, 1998）, p. ２8. Takita Yōichi, “Kokufu: Ushi-
nawareta 10 nen no kyōkun,” Nihon keizai shinbun, July ２0, 1998, evening edition, 3. Because 
magazines date their issues a week after actual publication, the Newsweek story would have 
appeared simultaneously with the Japanese newspaper article.
２ 　I have written on the emergence of the professional housewife as heroine of postwar middle 
class society in Fabricating Consumers: アンドルー・ゴードン『ミシンと日本の近代――消費
者の創出』（大島かおり訳、みすず書房、２013 年）。
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tion to this topic. In this paper, with a primary focus on conservative or establishment 
voices, I am interested to examine two aspects of the shifting ideological landscape 
that are particularly relevant to the erosion of confidence in the future of Japan as a 
middle class society: first, thinking about markets and competition as the means to 
sustain a good society; second, attitudes toward change in gender roles. My focus will 
be on policy debates or publically oriented statements by scholars more than works 
written by scholars for each other or for students. But this arena of discourse must be 
examined as we seek to understand trends in the practice of what we typically call 
“Japanese studies.”
　　To assess the widely shared consciousness of loss that took root in the late 1990s 
of course requires that we identify the prior more optimistic state of mind against 
which this shift takes on meaning. It is not hard to find such upbeat views, expressed 
with particular vigor toward the end of the era of high economic growth and a per-
ceived “catch up” with the West, even though some of the key problems associated in 
popular thinking with the time of “lost decades” were already noticeable. We begin, 
then, by examining some of the most notable triumphant declarations that an econom-
ically dynamic and socially stable middle-class Japan had become a global leader and 
even model for others.
Japan as Number One: the Japanese version
My point of departure is an important set of mostly forgotten reports produced at the 
end of the 1970s. These are typically called the “Ōhira reports.” They were prepared 
at the behest of then Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi by a large study group includ-
ing prominent academic figures. 3 They focused mainly on domestic issues ranging 
from management of the economy to family life and issues facing regional Japan, with 
attention as well to international relations. While reflecting some anxiety about the fu-
ture, the reports are most notable for their pride in Japan’s accomplishments. Calls for 
reform were relatively modest, especially when read with the hindsight of several de-
cades.
　　The context for this sort of appraisal was global. 4 The Ōhira study group was 
convened in January 1979. Five months later, the Harvard sociologist Ezra Vogel pub-
3 　大平報告書の正式名称は『大平総理の政策研究会報告書』第 1 ～ 9 巻（大蔵省印刷局、1980
年）。The study group officially began its work in January 1979.
4 　In his paper for this symposium, Naoki Sakai argues for the significance of a global context 
both for the creation of the earlier mode of Japanese studies that produced such positive as-
sessments, and the more recent shift toward more pessimistic appraisals.
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lished Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. A Japanese translation quickly fol-
lowed. The works were not identical, but they shared both optimism and the idea of 
Japan as a model. Although Vogel’s book turned out to have a far greater circulation 
in Japan, he wrote for an American audience; he hoped to encourage Americans to 
look outside their borders for ideas in addressing present-day social and economic is-
sues. Members of the Ōhira group addressed their policy proposals to Japan’s political 
leadership, although they too had an eye on Japan’s potential role as inspiration for 
others.
　　Much like the discourse of Japan as “lost” since the late 1990s, these upbeat ap-
praisals were local/global co-productions. Vogel began working on his project in 1976, 
and he had for some years been a close friend in particular of Satō Seizaburō, who 
along with Kōyama Kenichi and Kumon Shunpei was a key figure in convening the 
Ōhira study group. Vogel and Satō had at various times discussed the issues that 
were addressed in both Vogel’s book and the Ōhira report. 5 Other important scholarly 
works were also published outside Japan in the 1970s that saw the Japanese system 
not as destined to “westernize” but as one to which Western models might converge, 
such as Ronald Dore’s now classic study comparing British and Japanese industrial re-
lations. 6 It was in this context, but also in a context of engagement with more critical 
voices in Japan （and indeed, in reaction to their own prior views）, that the authors of 
the Ōhira report produced their study.
　　Somewhat like Tanaka Kakuei, and in clear contrast to other important postwar 
prime ministers such as Yoshida, Hatoyama, Kishi, Ikeda, Satō, or Miki, Ōhira’s per-
sonal background was socially and economically modest. He entered the Ministry of 
Finance from the forerunner of Hitotsubashi University, not from Tokyo University. 
He rose in the political world thanks to the support of Ikeda Hayato, his superior in 
the Ministry before he himself entered politics. Ōhira was a Christian, and widely 
read; among his intellectual influences were Thomas Aquinas and the British econo-
mist Richard Tawney. He took from them a belief in the importance of intermediary 
groups between individuals and the state, which would safeguard society from the 
harmful effects of either a radically unregulated market economy or anti-capitalist 
class struggle. Ohira advocated “reform capitalism” or social cooperativism. He was 
also impacted by the 「成長の限界」ethos expressed by the Club of Rome; he believed 
that the modernizing growth model had reached a dead end and needed to be tran-
5 　Personal communication, Ezra Vogel （May, ２015）.
6 　Ronald P. Dore, British Factory-Japanese Factory （Berkeley: University of California Press 
1973）.
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scended. Within the Liberal Democratic Party at that time he stood in opposition to 
the Fukuda stream that supported more defense spending and constitutional revision; 
he feared such moves would return Japan to a harmful “premodern” state. He was 
also concerned that the central state held excessive power and wanted to shift the 
balance of political and administrative power to localities. 7
　　The nine volumes produced by the study group all include the same prefatory 
“Proposal for the ２1st Century.” This gives the reports an overarching problem con-
sciousness with clear debt to Ōhira’s world view. The preface begins with a buoyant 
statement of pride at a new equality with the West: 
　近代化を達成した欧米諸国と日本は、高度産業社会として成熟し、多くの困難な
問題に直面するに至った。……日本は、明治維新以来、欧米先進諸国に一日も早く
追いつくために、近代化、産業化、欧米化を積極的に推進してきた。その結果、日
本は、成熟した高度産業社会を迎え、人々は、世界に誇りうる自由と平等、進歩と
繁栄、経済的豊かさと便利さ、高い教育と福祉の水準、発達した科学技術を享受す
るに至った。8
The proposal goes on to lay out the authors’ understanding of the different cultures 
that enabled these achievements:
欧米の文化が、神か悪魔か、勝ちか負けか、白か黒かというように、「二者を峻別
し対比」させる構造を持つのに対し、日本文化は、じゃんけんにみられるように、
絶対的勝者も敗者もいない三すくみの「三極低鼎立・円環構造」を特質としてい
る。絶対的一神教崇拝に対し、神仏習合の歴史的経験をもつ。ルールを守れば勝て
ば勝ちの「フェア・プレイ」よりは、「おのおのがその所を得る」ような「フェア・
シェア」の原理をもつ。都市の構造や家屋、庭園、生活習慣でも、「中間領域」を
大切にする「グレイ・ゾーンの文化」をもっている。9
Presenting a vision of East versus West that is itself remarkably binary, the authors 
see Japan as particularly suited to address the difficult problems faced by all modern 
societies, in particular「かつてない自由と経済的豊かさは、これまでの物質文系や近代
7 　本段落の記述は宇野重規の論文に基づく。宇野重規「鈍牛　哲人宰相と知識人たち――大平総
理の政策研究会をめぐって」『アステイオン』81 号（２014 年 11 月）174～177 頁。
8 　大平政策研究会「２1 世紀に向けての提言（総説）」『大平総理の政策研究会報告書』（大蔵省印
刷局、1980 年）1 ～ ２ 頁。
9 　大平政策研究会「２1 世紀に向けての提言（総説）」4 頁。
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合理主義の下で、ともすれば見過ごされがちであった人間の精神的・文化的側面への反
省を促し、より高度な人間的欲求を目覚めさせるに至った」.10 The authors, with Ōhira, 
repeatedly describe Japan and the world as entering「近代を超える時代」. In this new 
world, principles of harmony, balance, as well as mutual solidarity rather than individ-
ualism can be the foundation of Japanese leadership in a new global 「文化の時代」
where there are no longer Western models to chase.11
　　In a notably defensive move, the report follows its first mention of 「近代を超える
時代」 with a firm declaration that「前近代の回帰であってはならない」.1２ The authors 
were well aware that their phrasing echoed discredited wartime discussion of over-
coming modernity. But it seems fair to say that no more than the Ōhira writers did 
those wartime thinkers see themselves as atavistic. They were pursuing a vision of a 
globally relevant Japanese cosmopolitanism, grounded in tradition but transcending 
the modern, albeit a vision that was to be spread to the eight corners of the world by 
military might.
　　Given this echo, as well as the report’s reductive understanding of both Japanese 
and Euro-American culture, it is easy and in some measure fair enough to dismiss the 
Ōhira group’s vision of a new “era of culture” as simplistic and shallow. But I have in-
troduced the report’s underlying premises in some detail for two reasons. It is an ex-
ample of a mode of thinking that not only has deep roots reaching back through the 
war era at least to the late 19th century writings of figures who came together in the 
Society for Political Education （政教社） and its journal, Nihonjin ［The Japanese］. It also 
reflects an enduring stance of those seeking to define “Japan” in a continually changing 
and challenging global environment.
　　Such visions in the past, whether during wartime or in the mid-Meiji era, had 
been marked by a sense of crisis and embattlement, reflecting concern that in the 
rush to ape a modernizing West, Japan was losing its cultural essence. Against this 
background, the relatively confident tone of this manifesto is intriguing, all the more 
because it had not been the tone of some earlier writing by these same men. The ori-
gins of the thinking expressed in the Ōhira report―like the origins of Vogel’s project
―reach back to the mid-1970s. A number of the key figures in the Ōhira brain trust, 
including Kōyama, Satō, and Kumon, had been part of a self-described “Group 1984.” 
Convened by the entrepreneur Ushio Jirō, the founder of a major electronics company 
in the 1960s, the group published a manifesto titled「日本の自殺（Japan’s Suicide）」in 
10　大平政策研究会「２1 世紀に向けての提言（総説）」3 頁。
11　大平政策研究会「２1 世紀に向けての提言（総説）」3 頁。
1２　大平政策研究会「２1 世紀に向けての提言（総説）」1 頁。
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the February 1975 issue of the monthly magazine 『文藝春秋』.13 It drew much atten-
tion and brought its authors together with Dokō Toshop, at that time president of 
Keidanren.14
　　This manifesto shares with the Ōhira report a concern with the spiritual and cul-
tural character of modern life, and a belief that Japanese culture―or what it calls at 
one point “the Japanese soul （日本の魂）” ―held potential to overcome the economic 
challenges of the energy crisis “so long as Japanese society does not lose its「“self-
discipline（自律性）” and “capacity for autonomic decision（自己決定能力）”.15 But such 
confident claims are remarkably few; as the essay’s title conveys, the overall tone and 
substance of the statement is one of crisis and a fear of imminent disaster. The docu-
ment starts with a vivid account of the decline of the Roman Empire, blamed on elites 
pandering to the masses by providing them “bread and circuses.” It goes on, in a pro-
foundly elitist tone, to condemn present day Japan as a society likewise in moral de-
cline as its leaders, and its economy, pander to mass desire at the expense of social 
discipline and responsibility.
　　More specifically, Japan is said to face three great problems: lack of natural re-
sources, damage to the environment, and an inflationary spiral where excessive pay 
raises chase （and enable） rising consumer prices. But these are less economic prob-
lems than cultural, political and especially psychological afflictions. The root problem is 
the rampant materialism of a mass production society. Homogenized goods destroy 
taste, and standardized work harms laborers both spiritually and physically. Consum-
erism damages the home as well, when women pursue the convenience of instant 
foods and ready-made clothes and forget the joy of knitting or cooking. This modern 
system―essentially capitalist production and consumption although the authors gen-
eral stay away from the “C” word―has created a profound moral crisis of an “infan-
tilized” population, weakened popular judgment, and eroded discipline. To top it off, 
and in one section of this 40 year-old manifesto that hardly feels dated, an overflow of 
information circulated in mass media far too quickly for people to make sense of it on 
their own.16
　　The authors have a clear enemy in mind: the political left, especially the Japan 
Communist Party and the Japan Teachers Union （Nikkyōso） created these problems 
13　「日本の自殺」『文藝春秋』1975 年 ２ 月号、いくつかのコメントをつけて同誌 ２01２ 年 3 月号に
再掲載。
14　宇野前掲「鈍牛　哲人宰相と知識人たち」178 頁。
15　「日本の自殺」再掲載版（２01２ 年）100 頁。Quote marks as in original.
16　「日本の自殺」再掲載版（２01２ 年）100 頁、10２～106 頁、109～110 頁。
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and impedes their resolution. The left is blamed for an excessive or evil egalitarianism 
in an education system that moves students along at the same standard pace without 
recognizing merit, and in a welfare state that erodes self-reliance and discipline. What 
is needed is a turn away―“by consumers, by workers, by politicians, by managers”―
from egoistic self-seeking, a turn to self-reliance, strong leaders not afraid to give un-
happy messages to the people, tough love for the young, and recognition that material 
gain is not the sum of human happiness. The overwrought intensity of this long mani-
festo clearly reflects the conviction of the convert; the authors had themselves been 
student radicals―and Communist Party members―in their youth.
　　Against this background, the Ōhira report must be read as a radically moderated 
presentation of the problems Japan faced, and a dramatically more confident appraisal 
of the potential for Japanese culture not only to thrive but to serve the world outside 
Japan in a new “age of culture.” It is not entirely clear what accounts for this differ-
ence in statements written four years apart by many of the same people. The expla-
nation would appear to rest first in growing confidence; Japan by 1980 had weathered 
the storm of two oil crises in better condition than much of the advanced capitalist 
world, something not anticipated in 1975. Specifically in relation to the earlier article’s 
fear of the left, wage negotiations between cooperative private sector unions and cor-
porations had tamed the inflationary spiral, and the public sector unions had suffered 
major setbacks in a failed “strike for the right to strike”. Second, a report prepared for 
a Prime Minister is politically constrained. It cannot bemoan the present crisis to ex-
cess, especially as the Prime Minister’s party held power during the time the alleged 
crisis emerged, and it must allow the Prime Minister to offer some possible ways for-
ward through his policies.
　　The Ōhira report’s presentation of Japanese economy and culture as a strong 
foundation for a new “age of culture” thus had its origins in an antagonistic, anxi-
ety-ridden dialogue with the left, even if that anxiety was muted in the report and the 
antagonism largely unstated. In later years the report’s essentialist concern to identify 
and preserve something specific to Japan in changing times would persist, and a sense 
of crisis would return. But with the left increasingly marginal, its place as the per-
ceived enemy or source of the problem would diminish （although not disappear, as ev-
idenced in attacks on teachers by politicians such as Hashimoto Tōru as well as Prime 
Minister Abe）. A different axis of opposition would emerge, reflecting the internal 
contradiction at the heart of these manifestos of the 1970s. Even as it was positioned 
as an alternative to the programs of the Japanese left, the Ōhira report’s support for a 
Japanese cultural path placed it in uneasy tension with the incipient neo-liberal spirit 
evident in “Japan’s Suicide” harsh attack on egalitarian education and expanded social 
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welfare.
　　The first important moment in the rise of a Japanese version of neo-liberalism 
came just a few years later under the administration of Nakasone Yasuhiro, more or 
less simultaneously with advent of similar reformism from the right in the United 
States under Reagan and in the United Kingdom under Thatcher. Calling for a “total 
settlement of postwar politics （戦後政治の総決算）”, the centerpieces of Nakasone’s do-
mestic agenda included education reform and the privatization of government monop-
olies, above all the Japan National Railway. Nakasone intended not only to cut the 
huge debt incurred by the railway but above all to destroy the powerful JNR union 
（Kokurō）. There is some dispute among Japanese scholars as to how much direct car-
ryover there was from the Ōhira report authors to Nakasone’s economic programs, 
but the spirit especially of his project for education reform surely carried forward the 
gist of “Japan’s Suicide.”17
　　But for all that Nakasone pursued reforms in education and in public sector mo-
nopolies, through the time of his administration and well beyond, optimistic assess-
ments of Japan’s private sector economic system continued unabated or were put 
forth even more exuberantly. Only after the bubble burst, and even then not immedi-
ately, would a steady stream start to flow calling for reform of the heart of the post-
war economic and social system. Among the most famous early works in the “rescue 
lost Japan” genre were Noguchi Yukio’s Structure of the 1940s （1995） and Richard 
Katz’s Japan: the System that Soured （1998）. Such works were at heart attacks on bu-
reaucratic management of economy and society, and legal restrictions on the operation 
of free markets. After taking a closer look at how the Ōhira report affirmed the value 
of what it defined as a Japanese management system, we will look in more detail at 
the conflicted discourse of market friendly reform that has been the hallmark of eco-
nomic talk in the lost decades.
From Managed to Free Markets?
The Ōhira reports included a particularly interesting volume titled “Busines 
Management in an Age of Culture（文化の時代の経営運営）”.18 It offered a detailed and 
17　There is not space in this paper to examine this issue in depth. For more on the topic, see 大
嶽秀夫『自由主義的改革の時代―― 1980 年代前期の日本政治』（中央公論社、1994 年）第三
部、第一章「中曽根政権の理念と政策」２41～２54 頁、中北浩爾『自民党政治の変容』（NHK
ブックス、２014 年）.
18　大平政策研究会編『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 7 巻　文化の時代の経営運営』（大蔵省印刷
局、1980 年）。
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positive description of the special characteristics of the Japanese management system. 
In the 1950s and 1960s this system had often been presented as rooted in the 
pre-modern past and fated to converge to a more advanced Western system. Now it 
was seen to be an enduring set of practices that might in fact serve as models for oth-
ers. These included long-term employment and seniority wages, based on a culture 
that stressed solidarity among people （人と人の間柄）, and a modular “rhizome” struc-
ture to organizations, which they contrasted to a top down “tree” structure of Ameri-
can management organization. The “rhizome” model led to more fluid decision making 
involving all relevant parties. These organizations gave security to employees but in 
the view of the authors, they did not lack for effective internal competition; rather 
they possessed “the dynamism of competition for advancement which stood upon a 
foundation of solidarity and peace of mind.”
　　Turning to “competition in the market”, the report gave a ringing endorsement to 
what we can call managed competition:
市場における競争という面では、日本の競争は、「なかま」集団による競争である
ため、ルールにのっとって行われる限りは結果はどうであろうと構わないという欧
米型の「フェア・プレイ」ではなく、競争が始まる前から結果はどうなるか、最適
な分配方法（「フェア・シェア」）は何かということを考え、参加者が「おのおのが
その所を得る」ことを目標としている点に、その特徴がある。19
This report’s introduction laid out the above perspective in broad strokes. The rest of 
the document offered further details of practices such as the regular hiring of school 
graduates, the cooperative stance of labor unions, the coordination of financial markets, 
and the practice of administrative guidance. It repeated the point about “fair share” 
over “fair play” and cited Vogel’s Japan as Number One as the source.２0
　　The report did, at the same time, evidence anxiety that echoed the “Japan’s 
Suicide” when it identified signs of erosion of this now effective system, although its 
tone is muted and more optimistic. In an era when a once unimaginable freedom and 
affluence had been achieved, the authors voiced concern at the spiritual state of the 
nation. Echoing concerns found in Europe and North America in these years, they 
feared that across the advanced industrial world, a postwar regime of economic 
growth that promoted popular welfare through access to new technology, cheap en-
19　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 7 巻　文化の時代の経営運営』10 頁。
２0　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 7 巻　文化の時代の経営運営』80～93 頁。
Vogel quote on p. 90.
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ergy, Keynesian demand stimulation, and welfare states had exhausted its potential. 
They worried that except for electronics, no technological innovations were on the 
horizon. Demand management and Japanese-style administrative guidance had a cost 
in inflation, and the emerging welfare state was too costly for taxpayers to sustain. 
Turning to social issues, the emergence of the new middle class with「生産中心主義」
and「会社中心主義」, as the ethos of men, was laudable, but it had brought with it 
some worrying trends. One was called「個別化」, which seems to be not quite individ-
ualism but a partial secession from the group in pursuit of leisure and relaxation （yu-
tori）. Related was an emerging desire for instant gratification and pursuit of pleasure. 
This was related to a perceived self-protective （保身性） or selfish behavior, leading cou-
ples to have fewer children and speeding the aging of society. All of these economic 
and social problems were encapsulated in the notion of “advanced country disease,” a 
toxic mix of declining economic energy, political un-governability and social anomie 
manifest in terrorism, crime, youth delinquency, and suicide. But Japan, they con-
cluded, still possessed a dynamism and cohesion that was the envy of others.２1 Thanks 
in large measure to its ability to manage competition both within organizations and in 
the wider marketplace, it had so far contracted no more than the advanced country 
sniffles, hardly the flu or pneumonia.
　　As Japan’s economy continued to outpace its advanced country rivals and allies 
through the 1980s, an even more exuberant tone came to mark discourse on Japan in 
the academy as well as among policy makers. By the mid-1980s, declarations echoing 
the report’s binary divide of Western and Japanese culture, and elevating a Japanese 
style of labor management to the status of a model to the world, were common both 
among scholars and a wider public. Itami Hiroyuki, a well-known professor of manage-
ment at Hitotsubashi University, proclaimed his belief in the superiority of what he 
called a「人本主義的企業システム」which he understood to be the「日本文明の企業
的側面」. He argued that「日本の長い繁栄を考えるのなら、いささか大げさではずか
しい話だが、文明を輸出することを意識して考えるべき時期にきているのではないか」
―most notably, its corporate system.”２２ The eminent sage of Japanese-style quality 
control, Karatsu Hajime, happily agreed that「私の念願がある。それは日本での〔工場
経営に関する〕実験データを詳細に分析し、世界の人々に公開したいのである。……〔よ
り根本的に言えば日本は〕ヨーロッパ的発想の原点のひとつであるデカルトに嚙みつく
ぐらいのことをしなくては」〔ならない〕.２3
２1　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 7 巻　文化の時代の経営運営』36～50 頁。
２２　伊丹敬之「文明を輸出するとき」『アステイオン』創刊 ２ 号（1986 年）41～4２ 頁。
２3　唐津一「米国の破綻」『Voice』106 号（1986 年）1２3 頁、1２5 頁。
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　　Of course, with the bursting of the economic bubble in a crash of stock and land 
prices, followed by years of anemic, sometimes negative, economic growth, this happy 
chorus with its hymns of praise gave way to criticism and calls for change in the 
media and among some academics. The British magazine, Economist, was in the fore-
front among foreign press. As early as 1993 it gleefully reported a decision by Pioneer, 
the large audio-equipment maker, to force 35 veteran employees to retire early. “Capi-
talism in Japan is becoming harder to confuse with socialism. ...［The Pioneer deci-
sion］ is seen as a signal that the post-1945 tradition of life-time employment in big 
companies is creaking under pressure from economic slowdown.”２4 As the United 
States economy surged through the late 1990s, American-style corporate governance, 
often described as a “shareholder capitalism” in which the best outcomes for all were 
achieved by giving primary attention to return on the shareholder’s investment, was 
put forward as the new model in a renewed statement of―and support for―the 
America-centered global convergence of labor-management relations. Japanese firms 
were criticized for their adherence to a “stakeholder” capitalism that considered the 
interests of employees and of managers to be comparable to those of investors.２5 
　　But through the 1990s one found both in the wider society and among corporate 
leaders and elite bureaucrats an enduring attraction to the ideas and institutions un-
derstood in the Ōhira report to have provided the foundation for the nation’s postwar 
rise as a global economic power. To be sure, corporate Japan in these years made 
many quite significant changes in the workplace. As they had already been doing at 
least since the 1980s, companies facing global competition from low wage nations dra-
matically cut their numbers of domestic employees. They also increasingly turned to 
the hiring of non-regular workers in various categories: part-time employees, dispatch 
workers, contract workers. Perhaps because these changes were in fact quite exten-
sive, many in Japan spoke of the need for caution in the continued pursuit of reforms.
　　As one example, consider the 1996 proposal of Japan’s major employer federation 
focused on labor issues, Nikkeiren. Called the “Bluebird Plan,” this was in significant 
measure a managerial vision of a deregulated future where companies would be more 
responsive to market forces. The federation called for “structural” reforms, in particu-
lar the end to regulation of utilities, distribution, and transportation, said to drive up 
the cost of the industrial infrastructure. But Nikkeiren ended its call for reform with a 
strong caution. Although「市場経済・資本主義は自由競争原理を通じて産業の興隆、
２4　“To encourage the others,” Economist, January 16 （1993）, p. 66. 
２5　Ross Mouer and Hirosuke Kawanishi, A Sociology of Work in Japan （Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, ２005）, p. ２53 introduce such works.
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国民生活水準の向上をもたらしているが、一方で影の部分ともいうべき低成長、高失
業、所得格差、バブルの発生、行き過ぎた投機などの弊害を生んでいる。要するに、市
場経済・資本主義が内包する様々な危機・問題に対し適切なチェックを行い、いわばリ
スクを管理するシステムが必要になる。経営者自らがそうした役割を果たすと共に、社
会の中に市民・個人を中心にした新たなシビリアンパワーを育成する土壌も必要にな
る」.２6 The echo of the Ōhira report’s praise of managed competition is clear, as is the 
similarity in Nikkeiren’s explicit presentation of a “third way” that would avoid what it 
saw as the excesses of Anglo-American capitalism as well as the rigidities of social 
democratic systems. Nikkeiren here called on management more than the state to 
curb the excesses of the market, but it also called for a new civilian power of the citi-
zenry at large to play this role, and it mentioned unions as cooperative partners who 
were needed to help enterprises be all the more flexible in hiring and deploying work-
ers and in setting wages in “rational” fashion. The Rengō labor federation had a similar 
view. In 1997 its secretary general was Washio Etsuji, formerly a union leader at New 
Japan Steel. Interviewed for a front-page feature on “Private sector reform: the future 
of the corporation” in April 1997, he noted that「どの企業も大競争時代と声高に叫び、
危機感をあおり、雇用を奪おうとしている。安易な人減らしは生産性まで低める」.２7 
These cautious reformers of the managerial and union elite spoke for many. They 
found support in media commentary suspicious of too single-minded a pursuit of an 
American model.２8
　　In the early ２000s, the tide seemed to turn away from such caution in media dis-
course, party politics, and state policy. In ２003, the Nihon Keizai shinbun ran a high 
profile series on what it called the “Japanese disease” （picking up on much earlier crit-
icisms of “the British disease” of economic stagnation and entrenched labor power）. 
The paper condemned Japanese business leaders for failing to implement much 
needed reforms in how they managed their companies.２9 It was of course reflecting 
and supporting the ambitious free market reform spirit of the administration of Koi-
zumi Jun’ichirō, who came to power in April ２001 and would remain the Prime Minis-
ter for over five years （until September ２006）.
　　Koizumi pursued policies of deregulation and privation with unprecedented vigor. 
His most ambitious reform by far was to further deregulate financial markets by pri-
２6　日本経営者団体連盟「ブルーバードプラン・プロジェクト」（1997 年度～ 1999 年度）報告
（1997 年 1 月）２5 頁。
２7　「米国型競争社会を実現すればいいのか（民革――企業の未来を問う　下）」『朝日新聞』1997
年 4 月 8 日朝刊 1 面。
２8　Edward Lincoln, “Japan Hasn’t Really Failed,” New York Times, Saturday, February ２２, 1997.
２9　Mouer and Kawanishi, p. ２54. And/or find cite to original, January ２003.
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vatizing the massive postal savings and insurance system. He and his allies, most sig-
nificantly the economist and cabinet minister for economic policy, Takenaka Heizō, 
argued that this was the only way to insure that its assets were invested in the most 
productive sectors and enterprises according to a logic of the market rather than at 
the behest of special interests. They trumpeted this reform as the key to Japan’s eco-
nomic recovery and long run prosperity, and with a landslide victory in the Lower 
House election of ２005, in essence a referendum on privatizing the postal savings sys-
tem, Koizumi appeared to have triumphed unequivocally over anti-reform sentiment, 
including significant resistance within his own party.
　　Koizumi also pursued labor market deregulation with considerable energy. In 
２003, his administration won approval of a revised Labor Standards Law, which ex-
panded the scope of fixed-term contract labor.30 And in ２004, after two years of negoti-
ations with labor unions and opposition parties, his government enacted a new 
Dispatch Worker Law, which made it possible for labor brokers, until then limited to 
providing workers in a small number of service industries, to dispatch workers to jobs 
of any sort.
　　Koizumi’s mantra throughout his administration was “stractual reform without 
sanctuary（聖域なき構造改革）”. Takenaka and Koizumi’s other advisors likewise justi-
fied their reforms with a neo-liberal rhetoric that was considerably more forceful than 
anything heard in the postwar past. Takenaka, for example, dismissed concerns about 
growing economic disparities with the claim that while polices were needed to support 
those in poverty, if the rich got richer, so much the better:「がんばってリスクをとっ
て、どんどん稼いで、たくさん納税してくれる人は増えたほうがいい」.31 That the ex-
panded ranks of non-regular workers might lack buying power did not seem to trouble 
him. In a similar spirit, Ushio Jirō, a close Koizumi advisor and one of the charter 
members of the “Group 1984” which wrote “Japan’s Suicide（日本の自殺）” thirty years 
earlier, told a reporter who asked him about the negative side of deregulation such as 
the rise of non-regular work that deregulation had not gone nearly far enough. Only 
about ２0 percent of the needed changes had taken place during Koizumi’s time in of-
fice.3２ And another of Koizumi’s business allies, Miyauchi Yoshihiko, chairman of the 
30　Hiroya Nakakubo, “The ２003 Revisions of the Labor Standards Law: Fixed Term Contracts, 
Dismissals, and Discretionary Work Schemes,” Japan Labor Review （２004）, pp.4 ―２5.
31　「（検証・構造改革　第 4 部・当事者たちの証言：1 ）総務大臣・竹中平蔵氏」『朝日新聞』２006
年 9 月 5 日朝刊 10 面。In the same interview, he also dismissed the possibility that poverty 
was a significant problem in Japan, compared to Europe or America.
3２　「（検証・構造改革　第 4 部・当事者たちの証言：3 ）ウシオ電機会長・牛尾治朗氏」『朝日新聞』
２006 年 9 月 7 日朝刊 10 面。 
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Orix corporation, celebrated the shift from Keynesian polices that supported the econ-
omy with public expenditures to structural reforms aimed to increase the scope of the 
market economy. For Miyauchi, growth had to be the goal, and if one cost was rising 
inequality, so be it.33
　　But for all this rhetoric, even at the high tide of market reform under Koizumi’s 
administration, the enduring attraction of what the Ōhira report called an ethos of fair 
share rather than fair play was evident. The government’s ２001 draft of a proposed 
new Labor Standards Law included an initial declaration that “employers have the 
right to dismiss employees,” followed by the proviso that such dismissals had to be 
“reasonably” grounded. Labor unions, lawyer organizations, and the opposition political 
parties all objected strenuously to this initial statement. They felt it would weaken the 
doctrine of the “abuse of the right to fire,” which had been developed over several de-
cades of case law, although never written into legislation. In the end, the revised 
Labor Standards Law passed in ２003, while moving slightly toward deregulation by 
widening the scope of contract labor, also omitted the first draft’s affirmation of a 
right to fire while inscribing in a statute for the first time ever the requirement that 
dismissals be “reasonable” and not an “abuse of right.” A clause of the new law （Art. 
18― ２ ） stated “In cases where a dismissal is not based upon any objectively reasonable 
grounds, and is not socially acceptable as proper, the dismissal will be null and void as 
an abuse of right34. In addition, amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law included greater protection for women against dismissals either directly or indi-
rectly based on gender. A new Whistleblowers Protection Law （２004） outlawed dis-
missal on ground of whistle blowing, and a revised （２004） Child Care and Family 
Care Leave Law ruled out the dismissal of employees taking leave for child care or 
family care.35 
　　Of most interest, key business leaders were reluctant to embrace the affirmation 
of a right to dismiss. The head of Nikkeiren, Okuda Hiroshi （later the first chairmen 
of the merged Keidanren/Nikkeiren） put it clearly in ２001 as discussions of a revised 
law were beginning:
私はこれ〔解雇規制の緩和〕を最もやってはいけないことであると思います。それ
33　「（検証・構造改革　第 4 部・当事者たちの証言：7 ）オリックス会長・宮内義彦氏」『朝日新聞』
２006 年 9 月 13 日朝刊 8 面。
34　Takashi Araki, “Corporate Governance Reforms, Labor Law Developments and the Future of 
Japan’s Practice-Dependent Shareholder Model,” in Japan Labor Review （２005）, pp. 40―4２.
35　Woolf, “The Death of Lifelong Employment in Japan,” pp. 76―77.
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は最も警戒すべき便乗解雇を容易にするものであるとともに、何より、経営者のモ
ラルハザードに直結しかねないものであるからであります。36
　　Okuda expanded on his implicit call for corporate managers to act with restraint 
in Keidanren’s New Year statement of ２003, sometimes called the “Okuda vision” 
which called for a 「民主導・自律型の日本独自の成長モデル」. This vision was thin on 
detail, so it is hard to be sure in what sense Okuda and Keidanren felt a need for cor-
porate self-discipline, but the statement appears to echo the moralism of the Ōhira 
study group and the earlier manifesto on “Japan’s suicide”, which also spoke of the im-
portance of corporate and individual self-discipline in a society marked by ever ex-
panding desire for material gain.37
　　Even during the Koizumi administration, then, the attitude toward neo-liberal re-
form remained ambivalent or divided even among business leaders. As Sanford Jacoby 
wrote in ２005, significant numbers not only of labor leaders but corporate executives 
and academics were urging “preservation or incremental reform of current corporate 
practices.” They argued that too dramatic a shift toward American practices would 
“erode Japan’s comparative organizational advantage in customer and supplier rela-
tions, product quality, firm-specific human capital formation, and speed of execution.”38
　　And, as the post-Koizumi era loomed in ２006, a pushback against reform esca-
lated. It focused in particular on the recently expanded scope of dispatch labor, even 
though such workers accounted for a small minority of all non-regular workers. It is 
important to remember that the so-called “lost decades” were not a time of continuous 
economic decline, and certainly not a span of unrelenting losses for Japanese corpora-
tions. By the spring of ２006, the economy had been slowly but steadily growing for 
four years, and businesses were reporting growing profits. But criticism that these 
benefits were not widely shared came to be voiced even within the establishment. 
Shinagawa Masaharu, for example, a former director of the Keizai Dōyūkai, Japan’s 
second most important business association, presciently noted that「小泉改革は資本家
のための改革だったと反発が出かねない状況だ」.39
　　About one half year later, his predictions proved correct, as some key voices 
36　仁田道夫「雇用の量的管理」、仁田道夫・久本憲夫『日本的雇用システム』（ナカニシヤ出版、
２008 年）45～46 頁。「労働法改革と雇用システム――解雇法制をめぐって」社会政策学会編
『格差社会への視座――貧困と教育機会』（法律文化社、２007 年）80～81 頁。
37　日本経営者団体連合会「活力と魅力溢れる日本をめざして」（２003 年 1 月 1 日）。https://
www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/vision２0２5.html 
38　Sanford Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation: corporate governance and employment relations 
in Japan and the United States （Princeton: Princeton University Press, ２005）, pp. 7―8. 
158
Andrew GORDON
within the LDP rejected calls for further deregulation, in particular the proposal to re-
move the three year limit to the duration of any one dispatch worker’s stint. Yanagi-
sawa Hakuo, Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare, told the press “there are people 
among the dispatch workers who want to become regular employees, and a time limit 
is necessary so they are not stuck in that status.” The resistance here likely stemmed 
as much or more from the career bureaucrats with responsibility for labor and wel-
fare issues, as from the politicians who served briefly as cabinet ministers. One un-
named ministry official complained of the free market reformers: 「直接雇用を促すとい
う制度の根幹をひっくり返し、厚みのある正社員層を切り崩そうというのか。２0 代の
フリーターの 85 ％は正社員を望んでいるというのに」.40
　　Yanagisawa’s predecessor as Minister, Kawasaki Jirō, noted in an interview a 
couple weeks later that he and others among the LDP MPs were concerned that the 
benefits of recovery had not reached enough people, especially those in smaller com-
panies or sub-contractors to larger firms. Non-regular workers received no bonuses or 
retirement pay, and the minimum wage was much too low. Japan had become “the 
worst of the low-wage countries（最低の最低賃金国）”. Non-regular workers who held 
such jobs against their wishes needed policies to move them into regular status.41
　　Although he was in favor of some market-friendly reforms, such as the white col-
lar exemption on overtime pay, Minister Yanagisawa stuck to his opposition to further 
deregulation of dispatch labor. From autumn of ２006 through the winter of ２007 
（under the first Abe administration）, a vigorous debate on this issue set the Ministry 
of Health, Labor and Welfare against Keidanren; in the end the Ministry and their al-
lies among the LDP’s reluctant reformers prevailed. One reason was that strong DPJ 
resistance in the upper house, where it held a majority, was in any case expected to 
doom the reform. But the LDP was itself divided. 
　　Against this background, the made-in-America global financial crisis of ２008 fur-
ther discredited the cause of American-style free market reform, and gave a boost to 
those who supported existing practices of long-term employment. In June ２008, with 
the support of the newly-installed Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, the new Minister of 
Health Welfare and Labor, Masuzoe Yōichi, argued that “regular employment should 
be the norm.” The fact that a recent （and rare） murderous attacker of random shop-
39　「（奥田経団連　変容の 4 年　上）蜜月の実装　「改革」と響きあい」『朝日新聞』２006 年 5 月
18 日朝刊 8 面。
40　「（時時刻刻）派遣待遇、潜む危険　直接雇用義務撤廃を検討」『朝日新聞』２006 年 1２ 月 1 日 ２
面。
41　「「非正社員の代弁したい」　川崎・自民雇用生活調査会長」『朝日新聞』２006 年 1２ 月 14 日朝
刊 1２ 面。
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pers in Tokyo’s Akihabara district had been a dispatch worker provided part of the 
motivation for this stance.4２ But concern over the insecurity of employment and future 
prospects for non-regular workers was widespread, and it came together in the out-
pouring of popular support for the thousands of dispatch workers who lost their jobs 
during the immediate aftermath of the Lehman shock.43 
　　This conflict among conservative elites over the desirability of neo-liberal reforms 
can also be seen in the dissonance between “White Papers” issued by two government 
ministries just before and then after the global financial crisis. The Cabinet Bureau’s 
Economy and Finance White Paper of ２008 （written before the crisis of that year） 
continued to beat the drums of reform. It lamented the rigidity of「伝統的日本型企業」
compared to what it called「市場型企業」. The former―defined as companies that re-
lied on a single main bank and followed the “traditional” commitment to long-term em-
ployment―were unwilling to take necessary risks. The report acknowledged that the 
security of a long term position can lead to willingness to take risks by employees 
who will not be afraid to fail, but it argued that this potential benefit is outweighed by 
the fact that employees concerned to insure the long-run survival of their company so 
they can get pensions and future wage gains will not take risks that might upset the 
status quo. Further, the slow adoption in “traditionalistic” companies of incentive or 
results-based pay schemes failed to encourage risk taking.44
　　In sharp contrast, Ministry of Health Welfare and Labor strongly defended the 
core institutions that had come to be celebrated in the high growth era. The ２008 
Labor Economy White Paper likewise written and released before the Lehman shock, 
worried that employment in high value added positions was not growing, while inse-
cure non-regular jobs were on the rise. Further, an increased use of performance in-
centives for middle aged and older regular workers lowered morale by expanding 
disparities among employees. A rethinking of wage practice was needed. The report 
concluded that Japan’s notable practice of long term employment, marked by regular 
school grad hiring, learning on the job through experience, and attention to building 
career paths, was making a comeback. After having come under attack in the 1990s 
and early ２000s, regard for「日本型雇用慣行」had risen along with the improved econ-
omy of the past several years. The goal of policy was said to be support for such prac-
4２　「日雇い派遣禁止、範囲は　厚労相、法形成の意向　各党の主張に隔たり」『朝日新聞』6 月 14
日朝刊 7 面。
43　Toru Shinoda, “Which Side are You On? Hakenmura and the Working Poor as a Tipping 
Point in Japanese Labor Politics” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 7 , Issue 14, No. 3 , April 4 , 
２009.
44　内閣府『経済財政白書』（２008 年）135～14２ 頁。特に 140～141 頁。
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tices, highly valued by workers and by many employers.45
　　The following year’s Labor Economy White Paper―issued just after the financial 
crisis―took an even stronger position in defense of traditional institutions and prac-
tices.
厳しい経済収縮の中にあっても、政労使の一体的な取り組みのもとに長期雇用シス
テムの基盤を守り、その上に、新しい日本型雇用の姿を展望していくことが、今後
の経済成長と社会の持続的な発展にとって、極めて重要であると考えておりま
す。46
This clarion call to defend Japanese employment practice, issued in the name of Minis-
ter Masuzoe （later the governor of Tokyo）, does not make clear what would consti-
tute the “new form” to be added, though one assumes it would involve some degree of 
increased flexibility. Nonetheless, the overall tone here is hardly reformist. At a mo-
ment of intense economic crisis, the focus of this Ministry, at least, was on shoring up 
existing institutions rather than transforming them.
　　Under the second Abe administration, economic thinking and policy has continued 
to play out as a negotiation between defense of and desire for the status quo, and call 
for free market reform. On the one hand, the government has revised the dispatch 
worker law by eliminating the requirement that companies convert a dispatch work-
er’s position to regular employment after three years, and it continues to press to ex-
empt companies from the need to offer overtime pay to white-collar workers with 
relatively high incomes. On the other hand, in the parliamentary election of December 
２014, one key measure of success put forward by the Abe administration was the ris-
ing percent of college seniors who were winning promises of regular employment be-
fore graduation （内定率）. Also, in spring of ２015 as in the previous year, the Prime 
Minister pushed corporate managers with unusual force to offer wage increases 
during the annual springtime round of bargaining with unions, in a sign of the contin-
ued or indeed increased salience of a corporatist model of economic management in-
volving the state in consultation with management and labor.
　Another striking sign that a style of economic management associated with the 
heyday of administrative guidance remained alive and well in Tokyo was the role of 
the Prime Minister and METI in revising “guidelines for transactions” between large 
45　厚生労働省『労働経済白書』（２008 年）1 ～ ２ 頁、２54～２55 頁、２61 頁。
46　厚生労働省『労働経済白書』（２009 年）。巻頭に舛添要一「雇用の安定を基盤とした安心でき
る勤労者生活のために」。
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and small firms in 14 industries in spring of ２015. The revision was informed by “con-
centrated on-site inspections” of approximately 500 major firms. The goal of the new 
guidelines was to press large companies to share the burden with smaller subcontrac-
tors of the increased costs of imported raw materials and energy due to the sharp fall 
in the value of the yen rather than pass on those costs to the weaker partners. This in 
turn was intended to allow the smaller firms to offer pay increases to their employees, 
thus reinforcing a virtuous cycle of rising wages and rising consumption feeding back 
into stronger production and productivity, a cycle at the heart of the political economy 
of Japan as a mass middle class society.47
Beyond a Society of Male Breadwinners, and Good Wives, Wise Mothers?
Although its discussion of the issue was relatively limited, the Ōhira reports gave 
some attention to the social and economic roles women were playing and would play
―or ought to play―in the future. These were discussed in passing in the volume on 
economic management in an “age of culture” and more directly in the report on “en-
riching the foundation of family.”48 The authors remained very much in the grip of a 
traditional modernity defined by breadwinning men and home-managing women, even 
as they indicated their awareness of challenges to these roles and the world view that 
sustained them and some need to widen the range of life choices available to women.
　　In its report on families, the Ōhira group in 1980 already identified what remain 
35 years later as two of the most urgent related issues understood to be facing Japa-
nese society: an aging population and a declining birth rate. But the focus was less on 
the need for elder care, an issue that would emerge to prominence later, and more on 
offering women paths to fulfillment in their middle and older ages, as they were living 
longer and now had many decades post childrearing, which needed to be filled with ei-
ther hobbies or work （there is no discussion of providing fulfillment to men post-re-
tirement）. The report also identified a need for policies to support women who did 
choose careers in the working world from a younger age, such as better childcare, but 
the framing assumption was that for the most part, men would earn a living and 
women would manage the home.
　　The report envisioned a rich cultural life for such women in the years after the 
47　首相官邸「経済の好循環実現に向けた政労使会議」２015 年 4 月 ２ 日（http://www.kantei.
go.jp/jp/97_abe/actions/２01504/0２seiroushi.html）。２015 年 8 月 ２4 日アクセス。
48　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』（大蔵省印刷局、1980
年）。
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heaviest burden of childrearing had passed. While mentioning that about half of all 
women were working outside the home, it noted that women must be enabled to pur-
sue a wide range of activities:「文化、スポーツ、趣味、お稽
けい
古
こ
ごと、仕事、ボランティ
ア活動」. At a later point, in a section on「婦人の生きがいと生活設計」the report 
listed four possible life paths for women, one of which was to work outside the home, 
whether part time or full time. The authors did mention the importance of giving 
women the ability to make use of their education, ability, and experience in the work-
place.49 But the strong force of a male breadwinner ideology was evident throughout, 
as was awareness there were exceptions or challenges to such a vision. A bit later in 
the report, the authors noted that an established division of labor in which women 
work in subsidiary roles while men are the “breadwinners” was the guiding principle 
of the gendered division of labor in the families of industrial societies. But however 
much this was generally appropriate, there were exceptional cases, whether stemming 
from economic need or from women’s own ambitions. Society should offer chance and 
room for such women to work on equal footing if they wish. This meant offering not 
only part time work but equal treatment for those who did want to work on equal 
basis.50 
　　Toward the end of this volume, a brief section addressed in some detail （although 
only for women） the related matter of what has come to be called “work-life balance.” 
Titled「有職夫人の仕事と家庭生活への支援」it noted an「家庭のほかに専門的な仕事
と職業をもつ有職夫人が増大している」. A marked shift had taken place as fewer and 
fewer women worked as “family labor” in agriculture, small commercial operations, or 
home-based production, and more worked outside the home for wages. In this context, 
and gently anticipating the more recent strategic emphasis on women as a resource 
for the national economy, the report asserted the importance of opening pathways for 
women to make use of their high abilities in various realms of economic life so as to 
increase the quality of Japanese 「人的資源」. Specific measures put on the agenda of 
state or corporate policy were longer maternity leaves, childbirth leaves, child care fa-
cilities, shorter working hours, two day weekends, more annual and summer vacations, 
and commercial services to cover housework. The report acknowledged「日本におい
ても、多くの女性が、自分の可能性を社会的に開花させようとして、結局挫折してきた
ことは事実であろう。しかし、いまや女性も、家庭基盤充実のための諸施策の展開に
よって、その才能を生かし、社会の中で活動する大きな可能性を手に入れようとしてい
るのである」.51 
49　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』9２ 頁、18２ 頁。
50　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』133～134 頁。
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　　The volume on economic management touched only lightly on the question of 
women in economic life, but where it did, it echoed this tentative emphasis on giving 
women a somewhat greater role outside the home or family business in a way that 
pointed directly to the later emergence of a varied “portfolio” of non-regular jobs for 
both men and especially for women. In the future, this volume asserted, it will be nec-
essary to both retain a core of long term employees and gain greater flexibility in ad-
justing employment to a changing business climate. To this end, it will be necessary 
for companies to systematically offer specialized jobs for medium and short term as-
signments. Such an approach would enhance corporate flexibility, reduce competition 
for top posts （by limiting the number of long term employees）, and offer opportunities 
for good jobs for women. Similarly, an expansion of part-time work was welcomed as 
a way to offer positions to women and older workers. This would offer women and the 
elderly time to pursue a “cultural” life, and these jobs would not threaten the posts of 
the core of long term employees, and offering them opportunities for cultural life5２. 
　　The configuration of family life that runs throughout the various volumes of the 
study group is one where some women might find fulfilment some of the time by 
working outside the home, but where their basic commitment lay within the home. 
This vision was clearly connected to the study group’s underlying assumption of a 
Japanese cultural particularity suited to face common problems of the advanced indus-
trial world in a superior fashion. One key passage stated:
欧米先進工業国と比較した場合日本の犯罪発生率や離婚率のきわだった低さ、……
〔これは〕日本の家庭ならびに家庭基盤が、あのような急激な社会変動の衝撃にも
かかわらず自立自助と相互扶助とにより、変化への対応と相対的安定ならびに健康
の維持に成功してきていることを示すものである
This passage discussed “family” with no specific reference to women or men, but the 
only way to read it is in gendered terms. It echoes the gauzy nostalgia for a lost 
world where housewives poured their souls into knitting and sewing for the family, so 
vividly articulated in the passage from “Japan’s Suicide” cited above. For the men who 
wrote these documents, it was the special role of women to anchor the families that 
gave Japan its stability in the face of rapid social change. The Ōhira report went on to 
note that Japan was blessed with a high proportion of families where grandparents 
lived together with children and grandchildren, and more generally a warm network 
51　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』184～186 頁。 
5２　大平政策研究会編『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 7 巻　文化の時代の経営運営』1２8～130 頁。
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of human relations grounded in family life. The goal of policy should be to support the 
foundation of such families. Even as they noted that “today, with the rise in married 
women who pursue careers （職業）, a desire for husbands and wives to share ［family］ 
roles is evident,” the authors introduced a 1979 survey that showed the majority of 
people in Japan expected husbands to be primary breadwinners and wives to raise 
children, monitor their education, and shoulder the burden of elder care.53
　　I have introduced the Ōhira study group’s discussion of women and the family at 
some length because over the following thirty-five years, in Japan more than in many 
countries, the tension embedded in the report remains deeply entrenched; it sets the 
traditionally gendered modern family as the “guiding principle” of industrial society 
against a newer vision of women as social actors on a par with men in their opportu-
nities and accomplishments. To be sure, in 1985 the government adopted an Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law, revised and strengthened in 1997, and in 1999, it pro-
mulgated a Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society. This set forth the ambitious goal of 
realizing a “gender equal society in which men and women respect each other's 
human rights and share responsibilities, and every citizen is able to fully display their 
individuality and ability regardless of gender.”54 Today, the Abe administration pro-
claims the goal of building a “society where women can shine（女性が輝く社会）” and it 
promotes in rhetoric―including numerical targets―the goal of a sharp increase in the 
numbers of women taking on leadership roles in economic and political life.
　　But the legal reforms have been contested and tentative at every step. Echoing 
the spirit of the Ōhira report and a longer heritage of gender ideology, support for a 
more “traditional” gendering of society remains powerful. One finds evidence of this in 
the response to various efforts to enable women to participate more fully and on their 
own terms in social and economic life. Among the most notable examples is the re-
fusal of successive LDP （or DPJ） administrations to pursue legal reforms that would 
allow women to keep their original family name upon marriage, even after the Justice 
Ministry’s Legal System Advisory Council （Hōsei Shingikai） went on record in favor 
of this reform in 1996. This reform would not only carry practical and symbolic 
weight by allowing women to build careers with a continuous identity from before 
marriage and giving recognition to women’s identity independent of a husband’s fam-
ily. It also would have important practical implications for couples who do not formally 
marry in order to maintain separate names, and whose children are therefore consid-
53　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』34～35 頁、84 頁。
54　From preamble to the law, official translation, accessed at http://www.gender.go.jp/english_
contents/about_danjo/lbp/index.html. 
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ered illegitimate. 
　　Resistance to this reform is grounded in the continuing ideological power of the 
view found in the Ōhira report that the “family and its foundation”―implicitly a foun-
dation sustained by women in domestic roles―was a source of social stability and cul-
tural identity. Thus, when the Legal Advisory Council issued its report called for 
legalization of separate names in 1996, one of the leading politicians in the LDP, 
Murakami Masakuni （dubbed the “don of the House of Councillors） warned “this will 
weaken family ties （kizuna） and sow seeds of family dissolution.”55 Over the years, 
such sentiments have remained deeply rooted in the LDP, whose Prime Ministers 
have repeatedly invoked the divide in public opinion on the merits of the reform as 
reason to move cautiously or not at all. Indeed, public opinion polls on this issue have 
generally shown at most an even split on the issue, or else a minority in favor.56
　　In other realms of policy, one finds a more mixed picture, although one that ulti-
mately reveals the enduring power of the expectation that women anchor the home 
front. Osawa Mari’s important work on Japanese social security programs makes this 
complexity clear.57 She shows that on the one hand, the government has in its rhetoric 
moved away from the concept of a “Japanese style welfare society” that was the rul-
ing ideal through the 1980s. Prime Minister Miyazawa in the 1990s put forth a goal of 
social fairness alongside efficiency in speaking of social programs, and he lamented the 
absence of fathers as a distorting factor in family life. Prime Minister Hashimoto af-
firmed a commitment to「男女共同参画社会の実現」in the late 1990s. The LDP-Social-
ist coalition government in 1994 also called for a shift in welfare policies from support 
of male-headed families toward support of individuals, although few such policies were 
implemented immediately. But the pioneering long-term care insurance program, writ-
ten into law in 1997 and implemented from ２000, did take an important step away 
from elder-care as the private work of women in the family when it provided state-
funded services to those who qualified for care. One can read the significance of this 
step against the grain of comments such as that of the LDP politician, Kamei Shizuka, 
who complained that this system would destroy「子が親を介護するという美風」.
　　Moving from policies for elders to those for youths, one sees with astonishing 
55　Statement on floor of House of Councillors, January ２5, 1996. Accessed via kokkai.ndl.go.jp.
56　For Ministry of Justice list of polls generally running against the reform （though with in-
creasing acceptance over time）, see www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji36-05.html.  
　　法務省 HP「選択的夫婦別氏制度に関する世論調査結果（総数比較）」（www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/
minji36-05.html）。２015 年 8 月 ２4 日アクセス。
57　この段落は大沢真理『現代日本の生活保障システム』（岩波書店、２007 年）、7２～88 頁の記述
に基づく。
166
Andrew GORDON
clarity the persistence of the assumption that women’s primary role was in the home 
in the way the government has defined the category of young workers known as 
furītā. This term is not a legal status, and has only recently and inconsistently been 
treated by the state as a category of employment. It began as a colloquial term that 
came into common use in the mid-1980s, originally with a positive connotation of care-
free youth pursuing non-mainstream careers. The famous and notorious Recruit Cor-
poration gave the term a boost as the centerpiece of a marketing campaign in 1987. 
But in the 1990s and after, it took on the relatively negative connotation of young peo-
ple unable to get a footing on a strong career track, both in state policy and to some 
large extent in the wider culture. 
　　In 1991 the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare offered what appears to be the 
first official definition of the term in its annual White Paper on labor：「「アルバイト」
か「パート」と呼ばれている雇用者で、男子では継続就業年数 5 年未満、女子では未婚
の者」58 The Ministry of Internal Affairs in ２003 for the first time began to count the 
number of furītā in its「労働力調査」. It adopted a slightly revised definition of「15～
34 歳の男性又は未婚の女性（学生を除く）で、パート・アルバイトして働く者又はこ
れを希望する者」59. In this bureaucratic mind’s eye, when a woman married she was 
no longer a furītā even if she continued on the same job. Rather, insofar as she now 
had a husband expected to be the breadwinner, her official identity shifted from that 
of an individual in a non-regular category of employment to that of a dependent 
woman.
　　In practice the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has been more flexible than 
this definition implies. In a ２011 report, the Ministry described furītā as “divided into 
three categories: the「モラトリアム型」biding their time until the find an occupation 
they want to pursue; the「やむを得ず型」who while aiming for regular employment 
cannot get such work; and the「夢追求型」who have a clear future goal but are now 
working just to get by60.” In ２01２ the Ministry established a network of over ２00 “em-
ployment assistance” centers （就労支援センター） at public employment agencies through-
out Japan. Their mission was to help young working people in non-regular jobs, in 
particular those considered furītā, to find regular jobs with long-term stability61. The 
goal was to cut the number of furītā from its ２01２ level of almost 1．8 million to 1．２ 
58　労働省政策調査部『図説 労働白書　平成 3 年度版』至誠堂、1991 年、88 頁。
59　厚生労働省「若者雇用関連データ」２011 年（http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/２010/01/tp01２7-
２/1２.html）。２015 年 6 月 ２4 日アクセス。「15～34 歳の男性又は未婚の女性（学生を除く）で、
パート・アルバイトして働く者又はこれを希望する者」。
60　厚生労働省「若者雇用関連データ」２011 年（http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/２010/01/tp01２7-
２/1２.html）。２015 年 6 月 ２4 日アクセス。
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million by ２0２0. The Ministry defines those eligible for the program as “furītā and 
such （フリーター等）”, thus not strictly following the official definition. It makes not only 
those strictly defined as furītā, but also married women, and all men and women in 
non-regular jobs up to the age of 45, eligible for assistance.6２ But the great majority of 
those who use the program are indeed men.
　　Apart from the matter of gender bias in the official definition, this initiative is 
problematic for imposing a normative understanding of proper adulthood that stigma-
tizes the pursuit of a furītā lifestyle; for some significant portion of the population 
furītā was a positive choice rather than a sign of failure to find a proper place in soci-
ety. Still, given that many younger adults unable to find stable employment do indicate 
a desire to do so, launching this program made sense. Despite the formal opening of 
this job assistance program to married women, the overall context of the history of 
the notion of furītā reveals the enduring power of a vision of women as guardians of 
the family whose default mode was of employment as a supplementary activity.
　　The discussion thus far has focused mainly on the ideology and policies of politi-
cians and bureaucrats, with a glance at divided sentiment among the wider public in 
polls on the question of women maintaining their family names at marriage. Govern-
ment polling conducted at three year intervals by the cabinet’s Gender Equality Bu-
reau from 199２ through ２01２ suggests that the notably halting moves of bureaucratic 
and political elites toward gender equality over these decades have not been greatly 
out of step with popular wishes, even among women. To be sure, the proportion of all 
men and women （among roughly 3000 to 4000 respondents in each poll） who believe 
women should continue their careers through marriage and childrearing years and be-
yond has risen steadily from only ２3 percent in 199２ to 48 percent in ２01２, with hardly 
less than a two percent difference in views of men and women in ２01２. But when 
asked whether they supported the belief that “men should work outside the home and 
women should protect the family,” the 3033 respondents in ２01２ reversed a 17 year 
trend moving against that position. Those who supported this venerable vision of 
women as good wives and wise mothers had fallen from 60 percent of all in 199２ to 41 
percent in ２009. Three years later the traditionalists had jumped back to a majority of 
5２ percent. The proportion of women who upheld this view （48 percent） was not 
much smaller than the proportion of men （55 percent）.63 It is hard to know what to 
make of these contradictory recent trends （and a survey in ２014 revealed a swing 
61　厚生労働省「フリーターへの就職支援拠点を全国約 ２00 カ所に設置します」２01２ 年 4 月 9 日
（http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/２r985２00000２7f6u.html）。２015 年 6 月 ２4 日アクセス。
6２　Personal communication from Iokibe Chinami, Ministry of Health, Labor, Welfare, July 10, ２015.
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back toward support for women’s work outside the home, albeit still less than in 
２009）.64 The long term picture appears to be one of a slow and inconsistent increase 
in those affirming wider social and economic roles for women, an increase that has not 
reached a tipping point that might be considered a clear mandate for change.
　　It is also, finally, noteworthy that the recent push for women’s empowerment put 
forth by the Abe administration is in important ways a step backward from the logic 
of the Ōhira report. The members of the Ōhira study group were clearly proud of Ja-
pan’s cultural heritage understood to have enabled or framed the nation’s modernizing 
achievements. But they envisioned the future as an era of “culture” in which self-culti-
vation and fulfilling individual lives were affirmed more as ends in themselves than as 
means to an end of national power. The goal of promoting「社会に新たな活力を与え
る婦人の進出」was justified not mainly as a means to strengthen the nation’s economy 
but as a way to offer “fulfilling lives for women （婦人の生きがい）”.65
　　Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, in contrast, has explicitly boasted that he promotes 
women’s advancement as an economic strategy for the nation, rather than a socially 
desirable step for women themselves, or a goal grounded in ideals of equity and justice. 
He wrote in ２014―in the third person voice typical of politicians in many lands―that:
保守政治家の安倍晋三が女性が輝く社会というと違和感を持つ方がいらっしゃるか
もしれませんが、従来のように社会政策としてではなく、私は経済政策の重要な柱
の一つとして位置づけています。これまで人材資源として十分に活かされていな
かった女性の皆さんは、言ってみれば “ 宝の山 ” です。……能力ある女性の皆さん
に、どんどん日本を引っ張っていってもらいたいと思います。66
It is not hard to hear echoes of prewar and wartime calls for people to “serve the na-
tion”（お国のために）, in this call for women to be fully exploited as human resources 
to build a strong national economy.
Conclusion
One thing “lost” in the past ２0 years has been a mainstream conservative consensus 
63　「男女共同参画社会に関する世論調査」２01２ 年（http://www.gender.go.jp/research/yoron）。
２015 年 6 月 ２4 日アクセス。
64　「女性の活躍推進に関する世論調査」２014 年 8 月（http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h２6/h２6-jo-
seikatsuyaku/index.html）。２015 年 7 月 1２ 日アクセス。
65　大平政策研究会『大平総理の政策研究会報告書 3 巻　家庭基盤の充実』14～15 頁。
66　安倍晋三「アベノミクス第二章起動宣言」『文藝春秋』２014 年 9 月号、104 頁。
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as to what constitutes a good society and how it is to be sustained or achieved. As en-
capsulated in the Ōhira report, and with an explicit global framing, after several de-
cades of strong economic growth that consensus focused on the virtues of Japan’s 
mode of “managed competition.” It also rested on a gendered structure of society 
where women maintained the family, with exceptions allowed for ambitious women to 
advance into the man’s world of professional achievement. These views were never 
unanimous of course, but the main counter-narratives in public and policy discourse as 
well as in the academic world, both in Japan and in the Anglophone community of 
Japanese studies, came from the left or “progressive” camp. In the case of gender, the 
challenge came from feminists who sought gender equality in principle as a social 
value and human right, not as a means to national economic power. In studies of labor 
history or industrial relations this counter-narrative took the form of critiques of the 
Japanese model which stressed its costs. But through the 1980s and into the early 
1990s, those who put forth such critiques found themselves on the defensive in the 
face of the widespread evidence of its success, and they to some extent modified their 
views.67
　　Work in Japanese studies today, which focuses on the present moment or on con-
temporary and modern history, is situated in a more complicated intellectual environ-
ment than in the past. Over the past two decades, the main axis of opposition in public 
debate on the question of sustaining or restoring a good society has come to set de-
fenders of a “traditional” modernity against neo-liberal reformers, but a secondary axis 
of critique has continued, albeit with lower profile than before. It draws on the dis-
course of a global precariat and rising inequality. In studies of Japan it has focused on 
and lamented the exclusions inherent in the traditional modern system, arguing they 
have only been made worse in recent years.68 
　　The global attention given Thomas Picketty’s work on inequality has opened new 
space for such debate. At the same time, insofar as Picketty describes Japan―like 
most of Europe, the US and the UK―as having indeed experienced a heyday of rela-
tive equality over the forty of so years after World War II, he offers grounds to see 
67　Gordon, Wages of Affluence discussed the changes in the perspectives of scholars in Japan 
writing from a left or critical perspective as they sought to address the apparent success of 
the Japanese model.  It was written in the early years after the economic bubble burst, with 
awareness that the ground was shifting, but it did not successfully reorient its own argument 
to take account of the emerging critique from the neo-liberal camp.
68　Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class （London: Bloomsbury, ２011）, Anne 
Allison, Precarious Japan （Durham: Duke University Press, ２013）, Tachibanaki Toshiaki, 
Nihon no keizai kakusa （Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998）, and other works.
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the Ōhira report as the logical product of a moment when optimism seemed justified. 
With hindsight it is easy to dismiss its authors as shortsighted in their view of the fu-
ture, and dismiss their essentialist and static understanding of Japan’s own culture as 
reductive in the extreme. But these reports remain worthy of attention for the way 
they put greatest emphasis on enhancing the quality of individual lives or the vibrancy 
of local communities.
